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The Development of Empathy 
in Infants 
Doris Bischof-Köhler 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Zürich 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Empathy From a Cognitivistic Viewpoint 
According to current understanding empathy is an experience in which people 
participate in or share the emotional State of somebody eise on the basis of the 
other person's expression and/or their Situation. The emphasis on the emotional 
dimension expressed in this definition is rather new. Under Piagetian influence, 
empathy was more or less equated with cognitive abilities such as role or per-
spective taking. Only recently has its affective component been reacknowledged, 
but exactly which processes underly the empathic experience is still a matter of 
controversy. In particular, opinions differ as to whether empathy by itself may be 
called a mechanism of social Cognition supplying insight into another persons 
emotional State, or whether additional cognitive achievements have to be drawn 
on to procure this insight, and if so, how they are to be defined (for a review, see 
Gladstein, 1984; Strayer, 1987; Wispe, 1987). 
Among the authors who still emphasize the predominant role of cognitive 
factors in the empathic process is Feshbach (1978; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1986). 
She postulated two c o g n i t i v e and one affective preconditions to empathy: (a) The 
ability to discriminate and label affective states in others; (b) the ability to assume 
the perspective and role of another person; and (c) emotional responsiveness, that 
is, the affective ability to experience emotions. 
The ability to discriminate and label emotions is usually tested by exposing 
the subjects to pictures of a person expressing these emotions. At the age of 3, 
children begin to identify some emotions properly, but their Performance remains 
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imperfect up to the age of 6 (Borke, 1971; Reichenbach & Masters, 1983; 
Wiggers & VanLieshout, 1985). Feshbach used a similar setting to investigate 
what she called empathy. She developed a series of picture stories showing a 
child hero in an emotion-evoking Situation. Her subjects were first asked to 
verbally identify this emotion. In a second step, they had to specify what they 
themselves feit when inspecting the picture stories. Inasmuch as their own feel-
ing matched the emotion of the hero, empathy was supposed to be present 
(Feshbach & Roe, 1968). As may be expected, the children were more likely to 
correctly identify the hero's emotion than they were to declare they feit the same 
emotion, so Feshbach concluded that comprehension of another person's affect— 
that is, cognitive Performance—is an undispensible prerequisite for feeling with 
another. 
Role or perspective taking means imagining oneself at another person's place 
and, on this basis, understanding another's point of view and manner of thinking 
or feeling. Usually this achievement is ascribed to decentering as opposed to 
egocentric thinking, which is not supposed to develop prior to the concrete 
operational phase (Piaget, 1972). 
Among Feshbach's criteria, only affective responsiveness is known to be 
present at an earlier age. If Feshbach's proposition holds true, empathy could not 
be expected to occur in children younger than 5 years of age. 
However, there is empirical evidence that much younger children also show 
concern and compassion with another person and behave in a way that justifies 
the empathic attribute (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & 
Kinds, 1979). This evidence challenges the Feshbach position, particularly with 
respect to her cognitive presuppositions, which are either too sophisticated or, at 
least, somewhat overemphasized in their importance. Hoffman (1976) was the 
first to point out that empathy occurs at a much earlier age, and he was the first to 
formulate a theory about empathetic development. In his theory he emphasized 
primarily the emotional character of the phenomenon. The present chapter is a 
modified extension of his approach. It attempts to further clarify the nature of 
cognitive and effective components of empathy and to develop a process model 
of their interaction. 
Strategy of Analysis 
Current research in the early childhood development of social Cognition is char-
acterized by three features. 
1. Children's Performances tend to be regarded from the perspective of an 
adult mind, and sophisticated skills available to grown-ups therefore are often 
assumed to be undispensable preconditions. What is more, mechanisms of ra-
tional reasoning are considered to be the only Organizers of behavior, and it 
remains beyond consideration that other methods of organizing may exist other 
12. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPATHY IN INFANTS 247 
than rational mechanisms of Cognition. In particular, the potential to prera-
tionally organize emotions is underrated in this view (cf. Bischof, 1989). Thus, 
because emotion plays the main role in behavioral control during the first few 
years, young children's Performances appear as either deficient or limited to a 
degree that falls short of their factual potentialities. 
2. This cognitivistic bias is paralleled by a methodological peculiarity. Anx-
iously striving to be scientific, developmentalists have confined themselves more 
and more to research paradigms far away from real live conditions. Subjects are 
confronted with as-if situations portrayed in narratives or vignettes, they are 
demanded to reflect about their own and others' experiences, and they are ex-
pected to verbalize their judgment. This kind of procedure is all but appropriate 
in investigating young children (cf. also Eisenberg, 1986). Experimental designs 
that aim at testing "social knowledge-in-action" (Shantz, 1983) are still rare. 
Observation and experimenting under naturalistic conditions is only recently 
being reacknowledged as a research strategy, mainly due to ethological influence 
(e.g., Strayer, 1980; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1982). 
3. As a result of behaviorism, socialization is still considered to be the main 
or even only agent of development. The role of innate propensities and of 
maturational effects is scarcely discussed at all, and if so, it tends to be confined 
to temperamental features (e.g., Kagan, 1984). The possibility of empathy being 
an innate disposition has been suggested by Hoff man (1981), but was not pursued 
further by contemporary theorists. 
The strategy of the present chapter is to examine the problems just outlined in 
a phylogenetic perspective. With such an approach, it is no longer the level of 
human adult rationality that serves as a frame of reference. Instead, we start from 
the baseline of an evolutionary stage on which the achievements under discussion 
either were not yet present or were only rudimentary. Proceeding from this level, 
we ask for those phylogenetic changes that, complying with the demand of 
utmost parsimony, must be postulated in order to account for the novel Perfor-
mances encountered on the next evolutionary stage. This procedure is optimally 
suited to reveal how prerational mechanisms, in particular emotions, are trans-
formed by, and integrated into, newly evolved cognitive capacities. In a second 
step, we test whether the insight gained by such an approach may offer working 
hypotheses on human ontogeny. 
The presentation Starts with an outline of some findings about h o m i n i z a t i o n . 
Considering the life-style of early hominids it is assumed that sociocognitive 
skill, particularly empathy, has played an important role in their specific adapta-
tion as cooperative hunters. The picture is supplemented by references to chim-
panzees who, being close relatives of man, can serve as a model of earlier 
hominid stages. It is pointed out why the potential for mental imagination, which 
we share only with the great apes, has for the first time in phylogeny made true 
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social Cognition possible. Socialization hardly plays any role on the anthropoid 
level, thus the comparative approach is also apt to shed light on the weight of 
maturation in empathy development. 
Based on these considerations, a detailed analysis of the processes underlying 
empathy in young children is presented. It is stated that the empathic response 
requires different explanations depending on whether it was elicited by witness-
ing other people's expressive behavior or by perceiving the Situation they are in. 
In both cases, however, the existence of a self-concept is crucial because particu-
lar facets of self-recognition turn out to play an essential role in the emergence of 
empathy. 
Fbrming a self-concept is also a prerequisite to recognizing one's own mirror 
image. Therefore it seemed suggestive to investigate possible correlations be-
tween ontogenetic stages of mirror recognition and the onset of empathy in the 
second year of life. These experiments and their outcome are presented and 
discussed later in the chapter. 
Phylogenetic Perspective 
From a phylogenetic viewpoint, the phenomenon of empathy presents itself in 
the following context. Most paleoanthropologists agree that at a rather early 
point in hominization, man began to Supplement his diet with meat acquired 
through hunting large prey (Isaac, 1978). From comparison with carnivores we 
know that Cooperation in hunting and sharing of prey are the most essential 
requirements of a hunting way of life. The evidence is strong that both behavioral 
features were present in the early hominids. 
The psychologically interesting question is how early hominids managed to 
cooperate and why they were motivated to share prey with those group members 
who did not participate in the actual hunting. This question is by no means 
trivial, because neither Cooperation of the kind necessary to efficiently hunt large 
animals nor sharing of food is in the normal instinctual repertoire of lower 
primates. These lower primates live on fruit and vegetables that need no sharing, 
and to c o o p e r a t e means at best to participate in the same actions as the compan-
ion. In contrast, in cooperative hunting, it is necessary to detect the intentions of 
the other, and to arrange one's own activities in a way that complements the 
activities of the other. 
It is only on the chimpanzee level that indications of these new forms of social 
interaction emerge. Chimpanzees hunt sporadically and in doing so, they demon-
strate Cooperation of the more sophisticated kind. Some animals, for instance, 
cut off the escape route of a victim, or they remain quiet while another chim-
panzee is stalking prey. Chimpanzees also share their prey, which indicates an 
understanding of another's need (Goodall, 1986). 
Chimpanzees are equipped with a more sophisticated cognitive apparatus than 
the lower primates, and this may permit the behavioral pecularities just men-
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tioned to their improved cognitive abilities. By comparison, we may get an 
impression of how similar abilities could have evolved in early hominids 
(Bischof-Köhler, 1979, 1985, 1990). 
The Mind of an Ape 
What are the characteristics of a chimpanzee's mind? Since Köhler's classical 
investigations (1921), we have learned that chimps are capable of problem solv-
ing. For instance, they pile boxes on top of each other in order to get a banana at 
the ceiling, or they use sticks to reach for a fruit outside the cage. Meanwhile, it 
is a well-documented fact that they are capable of some kind of symbolic repre-
sentation that allows them to solve problems by imagination. The process could 
be compared to a Computer Simulation that takes place on an—as it were— 
m e n t a l r e h e a r s a l stage. Mental rehearsal goes beyond mere imagery, it means 
not only representing adequately but also voluntarily manipulating mental im-
ages in a way that takes the laws into account according to which reality is 
functioning. As far as we know, it is only on the ape level that this kind of 
problem solving occurs in evolution. 
For some time it was taken for granted that the cognitive abilities of chim-
panzees evolved because of their selective advantage for tool use and hominiza-
tion. But because we have come to know more about their real life under natural 
conditions, particularly from observations by Goodall (1986), the emphasis on 
tool intelligence has somewhat waned. Meanwhile the idea is much more favored 
that the intellectual capabilities of apes evolved in the first place to allow for 
more sophisticated social interactions (Humphrey, 1976). And we may speculate 
that the evolution of the human mind took a similar course. 
Not only do chimpanzees demonstrate their social intelligence in prosocial 
interventions such as cooperating, sharing, and assisting conspecifics, they also 
show a considerable repertoire of social manipulation. In this respect they even 
try to deceive their conspecifics by suppressing their own expressive behavior. 
Social manipulation is a main feature of rank confrontations. To acquire a high 
Position is not so much a matter of physical strength, but rather of using intel-
ligent means. 
The best insight into the cognitive mechanisms underlying these behaviors has 
been provided by Premack (Premack, 1983; Premack & Premack, 1983; Pre-
mack & Woodruff, 1978). He did not confine his chimpanzee experiments to pure 
language training; rather, he was particularly interested in the cognitive structure 
that allowed language training to become successful. In one of his investigations, 
Sarah, a language-trained chimpanzee, was shown video scenes in which a 
human caregiver was confronted with some problems that he pretended not to be 
able to solve. For instance, he tried to use a hose that was not connected to the 
tap. The animal was then exposed to a series of photographs depicting different 
Solutions, among which there was also a photograph of a hose connected to the 
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tap. As it turned out, in most instances, the animal chose the right Solution. 
This result is quite interesting as far as chimpanzees' problem-solving abilities 
are concerned. The really intriguing point, however, is the question of why Sarah 
was affected by somebody eise's problem in the first place. Not only did she 
understand his intention, but she participated in this intention and undertook to 
solve his problem vicariously. 
This last one is the important point. It was already made by Köhler: His star 
chimpanzee, Sultan, watched a somewhat dull group member who was ob-
viously not able to get a banana by using a stick. When Sultan was allowed to 
intervene, he quickly solved the problem but then forwent eating the banana 
himself and, instead, generously pushed it toward the companion. According to 
Köhler, this response indicated that Sultan really looked at the task from the 
Standpoint of the other animal. 
A l l these findings allow the following conclusion: Chimpanzees have insight 
into the mental State of other individuals. They obviously understand the connec-
tion between inner subjective experience and its outward expression. Of course, 
social animals below the ape level also behave in a way that takes into account 
the other's mood or intention. But they do this on the basis of instinctually 
preprogrammed responses to expressive signals from conspecifics. There is no 
reason to claim that they have insight into the subjective experience correspond-
ing to this expressive behavior. What is more important, the Situation of another 
one does not affect them as long as they are not involved in this Situation, but 
rather just observing it. Baboons, for instance, after having watched a compan-
ion getting caught in a trap, are not able to learn, from their observing experi-
ence, to avoid the same trap themselves (Kummer, 1980). Chimpanzees are the 
first species in evolution who not only perceive the other's emotion from outside, 
but are also able to participate in it and to experience the Situation from the 
other's point of view. It is on this evolutionary level that social Cognition was 
invented, particularly in the form of empathy, and probably also in the form of 
simple Performances of perspective taking. 
PROCESS ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY 
Definitions 
The concept of empathy was originally introduced into psychology under the 
German name of Einfühlung by Lipps (1907). When discussing empathy, a 
phenomenological and a functional perspective should be held apart. The former 
is confined to experiential description, the latter deals with the psychological 
mechanisms and processes underlying the phenomenon. 
Phenomenologically, empathy is the experience of participating in the emo-
tional State of another and thereby understanding it. It is crucial that the emotion, 
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although being shared, retains the quality of belonging to the other person. This 
specification distinguishes empathy from emotional contagion as, for example, 
in panic, in contagious laughter, or in shared ecstasy. In emotional contagion, the 
emotion of another person takes possession of observers without the observers 
being aware of this fact. They do not realize that the other one is actually the 
source of the emotion. 
The functional analysis specifies the Stimulus p a t t e r n that elicits empathy, and 
its i n t r a o r g a n i s m i c mechanisms. There are two Stimulus patterns that may elicit 
an empathic response: (a) the expressive behavior of another (expression-induced 
e m p a t h y ) , and (b) the other's Situation ( s i t u a t i o n - i n d u c e d e m p a t h y ) . Also, when 
analyzing the intraorganismic mechanisms, three aspects have to be taken into 
account: 
1. The affective component: What makes me participate in the other's emo-
tion? 
2. The s o c i a l - c o g n i t i v e component: How do I know, that it is actually the 
other's emotion? 
3. The m o t i v a t i o n a l component: What am I going to do? 
Responding to expressive behavior of conspecifics is already present in the 
behavioral repertoire of lower social animals, so expression-induced empathy 
can build on phylogenetically old mechanisms. To emotionally participate in the 
Situation of a conspecific, however, is a novel feature. So the question of how an 
uninvolved observer gets affected by another one's Situation raises a special 
problem. 
Emotional Contagion 
In order to understand how emotional participation is achieved in expression-
induced empathy, it is worthwhile to analyze emotional contagion in more detail. 
E m o t i o n a l c o n t a g i o n is a phylogenetically old phenomenon of great impor-
tance in social animals, well-known to ethologists, who call it m o o d i n d u c t i o n 
(Stimmungsübertragung; Lorenz, 1935). It synchronizes motivational states of 
group members and thus serves to maintain group cohesion. For instance, if one 
animal flies, the others join into the flight. The contagious response is caused by 
perceiving the expression of a motivational State in a conspecific. 
There have been several attempts to explain the process of emotional con-
tagion (Hoffman, 1982; for a detailed discussion see Bischof-Köhler, 1989). One 
explanation, mentioned by Hoffman (1982), connects the response to classical 
conditioning. As a paradigm, he used the case of a caregiver who, being in an 
anxious mood, handles the child in such a rough way as to release fear in the 
latter as well. Thus children would associate the anxious expression of the 
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caregiver with their own fear, until finally the expression all by itself would 
trigger the response. This explanation seems rather costly, particularly when 
applied to animals. 
Recently the motor m i m i c r y hypothesis, originally favored by Lipps (1907), 
has been reinstated (Bavelas et al., 1987). According to this hypothesis, the 
perception of another person's expressive behavior transforms, via innate sen-
sorimotor connections, into a muscular pattern copying this behavior. The ex-
pressive mimicry, thus induced, automatically arouses the corresponding emo-
tion in the observer by way of a James-Lange type feedback. The value of this 
hypothesis, however, is doubtful because the empirical evidence for both as-
sumptions is all but overwhelming. 
The hypothesis favored in this chapter builds on innate mechanisms, but 
proposes a more parsimonious explanation. It attributes the response to an innate 
releasing mechanism; perceiving an emotional expression of a conspecific is 
hypothesized to directly release the very same emotion in the observer. 
In the contemporary discussion of empathy, emotional contagion has acquired 
a dominant role, because there is a strong tendency to identify both. Plutchik 
(1987, p. 39), for instance, called empathy "a widespread phenomenon in the 
animal world," exemplifying this by instances of mood induction and social 
facilitation, that is, emotional contagion. Likewise, Hoffman's (1982, p. 281) 
definition of empathy as "an affective response more appropriate to someone 
eise's Situation than to one's own" does not indicate a differentiation against 
emotional contagion. And Eisenberg (1986) explicitly equated the two phe-
nomena: 
The individual merely reflects the emotion of the other. In this Situation the indi-
vidual feels the same emotion as the other, and is neither highly self-concerned nor 
other-directed in orientation. I would suggest that this type of emotional orientation 
be labeled as "empathy" or "emotional contagion" and that pure empathic re-
sponding occurs most frequently among very young children. (p. 31) 
There is a problem with equating empathy with contagion because the latter 
does not convey insight into another's internal State. Thus the social cognitive 
component of empathy is neglected. 
Being aware of this fact, Hoffman drew on additional cognitive skills to 
supply empathy with a cognitive component. Starting from g l o b a l empathy al-
ready demonstrated by newborns, which is purely contagious, he deemed what 
he called self-other d i s t i n c t i o n to be necessary for the next stage, namely, 
egocentric empathy, in which the child is for the first time aware of the fact that it 
is actually the other person who is in distress. The third stage, empathy f o r 
another's feelings, presupposes, according to Hoffman, role-taking abilities to 
understand that "others have feelings and other internal states independent of 
one's own (p. 281)." Thus Hoffman makes it quite clear that for him empathy by 
itself would not suffice to allow for social Cognition. 
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For the problem addressed in this chapter, Hoffman's stage of egocentric 
empathy is of particular interest, because it characterizes the first occurrence of 
an awareness that the experienced emotion belongs to somebody eise, hence, of 
empathy as distinguished from emotional contagion. 
The next hypothesis to be considered in detail suggests that emotional con-
tagion (global empathy sensu Hoffman) could well have been the phylogenetic 
and ontogentic raw material from which empathy developed as soon as self-
other distinction was available. 
Here the crucial question arises, which kind of self-other differentiation 
would be relevant. According to Hoffman (1987, p.51), it is the "gradual emer-
gence of a sense of the other as physically distinct from the seif," and this 
awareness is supposed to coincide with person permanence. Both could be ex-
pected to occur in the first half of the second year. A sense of seif as physically 
distinct from others, however, is already present in infants at a much earlier age 
(Stern, 1985). Hoffman further stated that "the affective portion of the child's 
global empathic distress may be transferred to the separate image-of-self and 
image-of-other that emerge (p. 51)," so it seems obvious that he actually meant 
something other than separated physical entities. Thus, the concept of self-other 
distinction needs clarification. 
Self-Objectification 
and Expression-induced Empathy 
What kind of self-other distinction could be relevant for empathy, is again 
indicated by experimental work with chimpanzees. Using a "rouge-test" method 
similar to the one applied by Amsterdam, (1982) Gallup (1970) could prove that 
chimpanzees are able to recognize their own mirror image. Gallup concluded 
they must form a primitive kind of a self-concept that allows for this self-
identification. 
The term s e l f - c o n c e p t has a specific denotation in social sciences. It refers to 
experiencing the seif as an object. In this sense it was first conceived by James 
(1961/1892), who called it the " M e " in contrast to " I" , which is the seif as a 
subject. This distinction then became central to the theory of G. H . Mead (1968) 
and was finally taken over and relabeled by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) as 
e x i s t e n t i a l and c a t e g o r i a l seif. In all cases, the seif as an object refers to the 
knowledge or image of oneself carried by the subject. 
Research on the seif as a subject, the "I ," is comparably scarce because this 
kind of experience is far more difficult to grasp. This point was already made by 
James, who found it impossible to define the " I" and ended up paraphrasing the 
phenomenon in formulations like "the thoughts themselves are the thinker." The 
problem lies in the " I" actually not being aware of oneself, but only existing in 
the ongoing process of experience. A conceptualization advanced by Stern 
(1985) may be helpful in this respect. He defined a sense of seif as "an invariant 
pattern of awareness that arises only on the occasion of the infant's action or 
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mental process. This organizing subjective experience is the preverbal, existen-
tial counterpart of the objectifiable, self-reflective verbalizable seif" (p. 7). Un-
reflective self-sensing is the characteristic mode in which infants experience 
themselves before the reflective self-concept emerges around the middle of the 
second year. 
In social sciences, research into the self-concept is primarily concerned with 
the components of self-knowledge. Typical question relate to how this knowl-
edge is acquired and which factors influence this process. The emphasis lies on 
content analysis. By contrast, the phylogenetically oriented, comparative ap-
proach taken in this chapter deals with the more basic question of which new 
dimensions of experience are opened for an organism capable of self-objectifica-
tion. Therefore, to avoid biased expectations, I do not use the term s e l f c o n c e p t , 
but rather speak of self-objectification (for a detailed discussion, cf. Bischof-
Köhler, 1989). 
To begin with, self-objectification is an indispensable requirement to solving 
problems on an imaginative basis. The image of the seif has to be shifted around 
mentally, just like the images of other objects involved in the problem. Self-
objectification, though, implies more than only an image of one's own body. It 
also includes the knowledge that this body is guided by a mental seif, which is 
the carrier of thinking, feeling, intending, remembering, and the like. This 
reflection on the seif (the " M e " of James) can be conceived of as if it were 
another person. From this perspective one can realize that there is an outside to 
the seif, which can be encountered in one's mirror image. Still, this outside is 
experienced as being only one side of the coin, it is the vessel of the " I " with all 
its experiential dimensions. Thus, self-objectification allows the realization that 
inner experience and outward expression coincide. 
Self-objectification is also the basis for the kind of self-other distinction 
necessary to procure the social-cognitive component of empathy. Due to self-
objectification, one is aware of oneself as being somebody separated from the 
other, not just physically, but rather on a psychological level, in the sense that 
seif and other are separate carriers of their own inner experience. This again 
allows the empathical observer to remain aware of the fact that the shared 
emotion is actually another person's emotion. 
Self-objectification depends on mental imagination, thus it does not gradually 
develop in ontogeny; rather, it sets in abruptly with the general emergence of 
imagination in the middle of the second year. This is indicated by several 
achievements that depend on imagination. Children attain stage 6 of object 
permanence, they are now capable of transferred imitation, they start solving 
problems on a mental basis (Piaget, 1969, 1975a, 1975b) and recognize them-
selves in the mirror (Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Bischof-
Köhler, 1989; Laubach, 1986; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Priel & De-
Schonen, 1986; Schmid, 1989; Schulman & Kaplowitz, 1977). 
Thus, the social-cognitive component to empathy would be procured by seif-
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objectification. After the Feshbach postulates of affective responsiveness and the 
ability to discriminate emotions, there is sufficient evidence that in the middle of 
the second year the child is well-equipped with both. Already in the first year of 
life, infants show joy, interest, fear, anger, disgust, and sorrow and they respond 
to other people's emotional expressions in a way that allows one to conclude that, 
on a prerational and preverbal level, they can very well recognize and discrimi-
nate those emotions they are able to experience themselves (Bühler & Hetzer, 
1928; Campos et al. , 1983; Haviland & Lelwika, 1987; Izard, 1980; Izard et al., 
1980; LaBabera, Izard, Vietze, & Parisi, 1976). 
Emotional contagion, as the raw material for expresion-induced empathy, is 
also effective in the first year. On an auditory basis it is well-documented already 
in newborns, who readily join other babies in crying (Hoffman, 1977). More-
over, there is growing evidence of emotional contagion released by another 
person's mimical expression, although this research has its methodological pit-
falls, particularly if conducted with very young infants (Bühler & Hetzer, 1928; 
Charlesworth & Kreutzer, 1973; Cummings, Zahn-Waxler, & Radke-Yarrow, 
1981; Field, 1985; Haviland & Lelwika, 1987; for a review see Thompson, 
1987). Furthermore, s o c i a l r e f e r e n c i n g in the second half of the first year is a 
quite impressive indicator of the effectiveness of emotional contagion (Klinnert 
et al. , 1983). 
One question remains to be answered: How does the infant come to know 
which emotional State corresponds to which expressive feature? The analysis of 
mother-infant interactions offers information as to what kind of experience is 
relevant in this respect. Caregivers exhibit a striking tendency to mirror the 
child's mood in their expressive behavior (Papousek & Papousek, 1977, 1979). 
This tendency is a cross-cultural universal. It may be caused by an emotional 
contagion of caregivers or on their empathizing with the child. The latter is more 
probable, because caregivers—though mostly unaware of their mirroring— 
know very well which mood the infant is in. By perceiving the caregiver's 
expression, the infant can acquire information about what being in a certain 
mood looks like from outside. The phenomonen of affect a t t u n e m e n t as de-
scribed by Stern (1985) may have a similar function. Given that emotional 
contagion were really a conditioned response, the mirroring activities of care-
givers would, at any rate, procure a much more natural basis for associative 
leaming than the procedure described earlier. 
Finally, the development of expression-induced empathy can be hypothesized 
as follows. Expression-induced empathy will appear on the basis of emotional 
contagion as soon as children are able to self-objectify, because they are now 
aware that they and another person are separate carriers of their own experience. 
When confronted with a person showing distress the children will not just be 
seized by emotional contagion, but will realize that the distress they encounter 
actually refers to the other's inner State. 
As already pointed out, however, this hypothesis can only explain expression-
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FIG. 12.1. Expression-induced empathy. 
induced empathy. As to the question of how an observer may get empathically 
involved in the Situation of somebody eise, we have to look for a different 
explanation. 
Synchronic Identification 
and Situation-Induced Empathy 
To explain situation-induced empathy we have to draw on a cognitive category 
that is a fundamental prerequisite of mental imagery in general, and self-objec-
tification in particular. This category may be aptly characterized as s y n c h r o n i c 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 
Identity is originally a category of perception. It unites separately perceived 
phenomena into realizations, aspects, or states of one and the same entity. Identi-
fied phenomena may, or may not, be equal in appearance. 
The earliest phylo- and ontogenetically form in which this category appears 
has been labeled d i a c h r o n i c i d e n t i t y by Bischof (1985, 1987), because it has a 
time-bridging function: Phenomena following each other in time are perceived as 
being subsequent states of the same entity. Diachronic identification allows us to 
(a) expect something to persist, even though it may not be perceivable all the 
time, and (b) recognize two subsequent appearances as belonging to the same 
item even when they change in form or quality. The frog who becomes a prince 
after having been kissed by the princess nevertheless retains his (diachronic) 
identity. 
To be able to represent reality in imagination, a second mode of identity 
perception is required. Here it becomes necessary that two phenomena given at 
the same time, but separated in space, are perceived as being the same. Bischof 
(1985, 1987) proposed to specify this new form of perceptual categorization as 
s y n c h r o n i c i d e n t i t y . Again, equality of appearance is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition of identity. One egg looks just like another egg and still they 
are not the same: Incubating one would not make the other one hatch. In contrast, 
the little puppet into which the voodoo priest sticks his needles, only remotely 
Expression of Emotional 
the other contagion 
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resembles the life victim, and nevertheless the latter is expected to suffer from the 
procedure. 
The first important function of synchronic identification is to connect images 
with reality. We must be able to realize that the ideal object, which we tentatively 
shift in our imagination, to another place, is identical with the real object still 
perceivable and unmoved at its old site. In addition, synchronic identity is 
responsible for the s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n , that is, it relates verbal concepts to the 
facts they denote. Thirdly, synchronic identification may relate two facts per-
ceived in reality, making one appear as a symbol of the other, as in the voodoo 
example or, more commonly, in the case of a Photographie image and the 
original Situation. And finally, synchronic identification yokes the " I" as the 
subject and carrier of one's own experience to the objectified and reflected-on 
"Me , " thereby allowing that " I " recognize my mirror image as " M e " myself. 
The latter case provides a clue to our problem of how a bystander can become 
empathically involved in the Situation of another person. Here again, it is crucial 
that " M e " and "You" are perceived as essentially identical. " I " am then related 
to "You" similar to the way we both relate to 4 4 Me." Just as I identify my own 
outside as the other aspect of my inner experience, I realize that the same holds 
true for the other's outside. The other's experience, then, is in essence the same 
as mine. Thus, the other person qualifies as an object of synchronic identifica-
tion. As a consequence, everything that happens to the other person is perceived 
as something concerning me as well, and I respond emotionally to the other's 
Situation as if I were in that person's place.1 
The following example may illustrate the process. Imagine somebody sitting 
down in a chair that collapses. People witnessing the scene burst out laughing, 
which is a rather embarrassing reaction. Why do they laugh, nevertheless? 
Laughter after such events means relief from a mild shock. But why were the 
bystanders shocked in the first place? Obviously, because they identified with the 
victim, until the "all clear" signal was given by the insight that nothing really 
serious happened and allowed the bystanders to relax. 
This kind of experience should not be confounded with perspective taking. In 
the latter, I voluntarily imagine myself at the place of the other. In empathic 
identification, I cannot help but feel as if I were in the other's position. It is for 
this reason that I prefer using the term p e r s p e c t i v e - i n d u e t i o n in the present 
context (Bischof-Köhler, 1989). 
It is important to realize that identification does not result in any form of 
emotional fusion comparable to emotional contagion. As Fig. 12.2 shows, in 
•Whether the empathic response represents the other person's emotional State veridically is only 
of secondary importance. Empathizers may, to a certain degree, respond in an egocentric fashion. 
After all, it seems like a good strategy to Start from the emotional "zero hypothesis" that You and I 
feel in a similar way. In many cases this expectation will hold true or at least procure a good 
approximation. Where it fails, perspective-taking skills, as they gradually develop after the onset of 
empathizing, have to step in and provide a more refined insight into the other's experience. 
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situation-induced empathy, self-objectification actually has two functions: It pro-
vides one pole for synchronic identification, allowing one to experience oneself 
as being essentially the same as the other, and consequently to perceive the 
other's Situation as if it were one's own Situation (perspective induction). At the 
same time, as in expression-induced empathy, it allows for self-other distinc-
tion, which is necessary to supply the empathic response with insight into the 
true source of the feeling and thereby to distinguish it from emotional contagion. 
Situation-induced empathy, as based on synchronic identification, does not 
presuppose the association of having gone through a similar Situation oneself. As 
long as the Situation of the other, in the first place, has the potential of becoming 
relevant to the observer, the empathic response will occur. I need not have 
experienced the loss of a beloved relative to empathize with a mourner. This is 
nicely demonstrated by the example of a 4-year-old boy who, on hearing about 
the death of his friend's mother, said solemnly: 44 You know, when Bonnie grows 
up, people will ask her who was her mother, and she will have to say 4I don't 
know.' You know, it makes tears come in my eyes" (From Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-
Waxler, & Chapman, 1983). Examples like this reveal that synchronic identifica-
tion is also the crucial mechanism that allows learning from another person's 
experience. 
Motivational Consequences of Empathy 
The third component of empathy listed earlier, namely, its motivational conse-
quences, is one of particular importance for the phylogenetic problem of how 
Cooperation and sharing of prey were achieved by early hominids. This compo-
nent may also serve to operationalize empathy on a preverbal developmental 
level as in apes and young infants. 
Empathical distress results in a motivational tension to terminate this distress 
(Hoffman, 1976; Hornstein, 1978). One Solution would be to go away and 
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thereby to avoid the source of empathic distress. But, in contrast to emotional 
contagion, the truly empathic observer is aware of the fact that it is primarily the 
other person whose condition is at stake. These people and their plight remain 
represented in imagery, running away would not terminate empathic distress. 
What really matters is to change the Situation for others, by comforting them, 
helping them, or vicariously fulfilling their intention. Cooperation, as well, is 
primarily based on an empathic response. By identification, the observer partici-
pates in the intention of the other and, after doing so, can figure out which 
activity is most appropriate to reach the goal. 
Not in every case, however, does empathy result in prosocial behavior. There 
are other factors that may affect the preparedness to intervene. With respect to 
young children, in particular, the following variables have to be taken into 
consideration. 
First of all, familiarity with the person in need is generally known to be a 
factor of great importance to the promotion of altruism. In small children it 
counts even more, because an unfamiliar person may release a stranger reaction 
and fear may prevail. Children's preparedness to help may also be influenced by 
their individual enterprise and competence, both of which cannot be presumed to 
be very high in younger children. Finally, the child may be preoccupied by 
another intention and unable to postpone it. 
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that not every prosocial interven-
tion is necessarily released by empathy. Young children may have been trained to 
respond prosocially, and when they behave accordingly, they may do so without 
emotional involvement. 
Finally a factor has to be mentioned that is scarcely taken into consideration in 
the literature at all. The majority of writers consider the motivational conse-
quences of empathy to lie exclusively in the prosocial sector. Either the em-
pathical response, whenever it centers on the other person's distress, is just 
globally called sympathy (Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 1982), or empathy is 
altogether defined as concern or compassion with another person's welfare (Bat-
son & Coke, 1981). 
However, the motives based on empathy are by no means only prosocial. 
Empathy can very well be focused on the other person and still result in just the 
opposite of sympathy. Whether empathic observers feel compassion with a dis-
tressed person depends on the kind of relationship they hold to this person. If the 
relationship is bad, the same Situation may trigger malicious gloating. In this 
emotional response the empathically shared distress of the other person is at the 
same time enjoyed. Likewise, the connection of aggression with empathy may 
result in antisocial consequences. Only creatures capable of empathy are able to 
sense that their aggressive behavior hurts the recipient. In phylogeny, the emer-
gence of empathy was, at the same time, the emergence of intentional cruelty and 
sadism. 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Hypothesis 
The ideas already outlined generate questions that can be addressed by empirical 
research. In the second part of this chapter, some of our own investigations on the 
development of empathy in human infants are reported. In these experiments we 
proceeded from the assumption that the affective preconditions of empathy— 
such as the ability to discriminate emotions, emotional responsiveness in gener-
al, and the susceptibility to emotional contagion in particular—are already pres-
ent in the first year. The cognitive requirements, defined as self-objectification 
and synchronic identification, emerge, along with the onset of mental imagery, 
only in the middle of the second year. These two abilities are also responsible for 
recognizing one's own mirror image, so the hypothesis was generated that empa-
thy should spontaneously occur in all children as soon as they are able to recog-
nize their own mirror image. 
Presented with a Situation in which a person demonstrates distress, empathic 
children should show emotional concern and compassion, and indicate by their 
actions that they comprehend the emotional condition of the distressed person to 
be at stake. We consider concerned other-centered activities to be the only feasi-
ble operationalization of empathy at this developmental stage. Verbal inquiry 
remains beyond question. Matching of emotional expression alone would not 
sufifice to distinguish empathy from emotional contagion and may not even be a 
feature that necessarily accompanies the empathic response (cf. Strayer, 1980). 
Children who have not yet reached the empathy stage should either succumb 
to emotional contagion and seek comfort for themselves, or they should remain 
indifferent because they are not yet able to identify themselves with the distressed 
person and therefore are not affected by his Situation. 
Experiment 
We conducted a pilot study with 17 children (9 girls and 8 boys), and a main 
investigation with 36 children (19 girls and 17 boys), age-range 16 to 24 months, 
from the town of Zürich with a Swiss-German-speaking middle-class back-
ground (Bischof-Köhler, 1988, 1989; Bischof-Köhler & Laubach, 1985; 
Bischof-Köhler et al. , 1986; Heusi, 1987; Laubach, 1986; Schmid-Fieberg, 
1989). Both investigations consisted of two parts: an empathy experiment and a 
test of mirror recognition. The pilot study was conducted by a Single experiment-
er. In the main study, the empathy investigation and the mirror-recognition test 
were conducted by two different students who were kept strictly uninformed 
about each other's results until the evaluation was completed. The pilot study 
yielded essentially the same results as the main investigation. Only the results of 
the main investigation are referred to in detail in this chapter. 
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E m p a t h y : D e s i g n . Empathy was tested in a m a i n p l a y session with a grown-
up female playmate, who had already been familiarized to the child in a 30-
minute unstructured w a r m - u p session on a previous day. For the main session the 
playmate brought a teddybear along, which, after about 20 minutes of handling, 
she accidentally broke so that it lost its arm. Thereafter she started mourning and 
sobbing moderately for about 150 seconds (grief period). Once during this period 
she explicitly verbalized her grief ("my teddy is broken"), meanwhile, the teddy 
and its arm lay on the floor between herseif and the child. Subsequently, if the 
child had not intervened, the playmate put the teddy aside "in order for him to 
have a rest," and took up playing again for at least 10 minutes, whereupon she 
left the room, telling the child that she was going to repair the teddy at home. The 
mother was present the whole time, but was instructed to hold back and only 
intervene on the child's request. The teddy's arm could be refixed by the child 
himself. Both the warm-up and the main play sessions were videotaped through 
one-way mirrors. 
M i r r o r R e c o g n i t i o n : D e s i g n . Self-recognition was tested with a r o u g e - t e s t 
method (Amsterdam, 1972). At the beginning of the warm-up session, the child 
was exposed to a mirror without any markings (110 X 80 cm) in a small room for 
60 seconds. Then a dark blue eye-shadow marking was inconspicuously affixed 
to the cheek, and the child was again placed in front of the mirror, this time for 
180 seconds. The room contained no toys except a little foam rubber ball. The 
mother was present but seated in a way that the child could not perceive her in the 
mirror. The session was videotaped. 
Results 
Both empathy investigation and the mirror-recognition test were evaluated in 
three Steps. The first evaluation was carried out on the basis of purely intuitive 
criteria. Both investigators independently had to group the children according to 
their subjective impression, with respect to empathy or mirror recognition, re-
spectively. In a second step the experimenters attempted to describe the chil-
dren's behavior as thoroughly as possible by means of objective categories (em-
pathy: the grief period and the subsequent 3 minutes; mirror recognition: the 
whole session). The categories, partly Single events, partly interval durations, 
were encoded and stored in a Computer (PDP model 11/34). Finally, each intu-
itive group was operationalized by a list of those objective categories that al-
lowed the Computer to reconstruct the intuitive grouping. 
E m p a t h y : Results. On the intuitive basis, four patterns of subjects' reactions 
were distinguished (number of subjects in parentheses): 
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Helpers (11): These children showed concern and/or compassion and tried to 
change the Situation of playmates, by either trying to console them, or attempting 
to repair the teddy by securing help from their mothers. 
Blocked helpers (7): The children were concerned and either showed a similar 
behavior as the helpers, but delayed their helping attempts until after the end of 
the grief period, or they tried to draw their mothers' attention to the accident by 
continuously verbalizing about the event and pointing at the playmate. 
Perplexed (10): The children sobered in their expression and could not avert 
their attention from the playmate. They stopped playing, but did not show any 
attempt to intervene. They gave the impression that they did not quite understand 
what was going on and seemed to wait until the playmate resumed playing. 
Indifferent (8): These children exhibited a short orienting response but soon lost 
interest in the playmate and went on playing either by themselves or with their 
mother. They did not show any concern or attempt to help. Two children of this 
group even walked around with displaylike behavior, shouting and showing off. 
Helpers and blocked helpers were classified as empathizers, the perplexed and 
the indifferent as nonempathizers. 
Figure 12.3 shows the decision tree according to which a Computer recon-
struction of the intuitive grouping could be achieved. The following categories 
proved relevant for operationalization: 
• Prosocial intervention during the grief period or within 3 minutes afterward 
• Repeatedly approaching mother and drawing her attention to playmate; 
• Length of play-activity during grief period; 
• Length of focusing on playmate and/or teddy during grief period; 
• Display behavior. 
The main criterium for empathy, p r o s o c i a l I n t e r v e n t i o n , was operationalized 
by the following behaviors: Child repairs teddy; tries to repair teddy; calls mother 
to repair teddy; offers another toy to playmate; urges mother to approach play-
mate; stays close to playmate and tries to reinstate eye contact. The child had to 
show at least one of these features. Most of them, particularly the last one, 
occurred with others2. 
Children who did not intervene prosocially during or after the grief period were 
nevertheless rated as empathic if they approached the mother more than once and 
2lt should be pointed out that for the empathizers it was really the playmate's condition that 
counted in the first place. The empathizers did not just start mourning because of being deprived of 
the teddy as a toy, but they became really concerned only after checking back with the playmates and 
making sure that they were serious about their mourning. 
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FIG. 12.3. Decision tree with 
objective criteria for the empa-
thy grouping. 
called her attention to the playmate by commenting on the event with a sad voice 
four times or more during the grief period. It turned out that, additionally, these 
children played during less than 50% of the time during the grief period. 
Children, who neither intervened nor tried to call their mother's attention were 
rated as nonempathizers. They divided into two groups according to their play 
behavior during the grief period. The group of the perplexed played less than 
40% of the grief period time, whereas the indifferent played more than 50%, or 
showed repeated display behavior. D i s p l a y b e h a v i o r is operationally defined as 
shouting with loud voice, marching conspicuously, foot-stamping, and/or knock-
ing and rattling on objects. 
Duration of play-activity exhibited significant differences between the per-
plexed and the indifferent (U = 3.60, p < 0.01), as well as between Helpers and 
Indifferent (U = 3.63, p < 0.01). The difference between Helpers and Blocked 
Helpers, and between Blocked Helpers, Perplexed, and Indifferent, is not signifi-
cant (according to Dunn's test for large samples). 
Duration of focusing on playmate and/or teddy, although not required for 
Computer reconstruction of the intuitive grouping, offers an additional objective 
criterion for the child's degree of concern. Helpers focus significantly longer on 
the playmate and/or teddy than the Indifferent (U = 4.28, p < 0.01); Blocked 
Helpers and the Perplexed also demonstrate significantly longer focusing than the 
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Indifferent (U = 2.57, p < 0.05; U = 2.84, p < 0.05). The difference between 
Helpers, Blocked Helpers, and the Perplexed was not significant. 
Emotional expressive behavior (voice, mimics), which played an important 
role for the intuitive grouping, was not included in the operationalization. Help-
ers and Blocked Helpers showed predominantly a concerned expression, Per-
plexed children demonstrated a bewildered, helpless expression, Indifferent chil-
dren appeared neutral. 
Additionally the following variables were evaluated: Closeness to mother 
versus explorativity, relation to playmate, relation to teddy, and number of sib-
lings. No correlation between these variables and the empathy grouping could be 
established. The influence of age and sex is discussed later. 
M i r r o r - r e c o g n i t i o n : Results. The behavior of the children in front of the 
mirror was evaluated in two ways. 
1. Dichotomous analysis. Children were grouped according to the "hard" 
criteria of localization of the marking and calling the mirror image by one's own 
proper name. Children who localized the marking on their face or named them-
selves properly, were classified as mirror-positives (21 mark-localization, part-
ly paralleled by naming, 1 naming alone). Children who did not respond 
to the marking or who tried to localize it in the mirror, qualified as mirror-
negatives (14). 
2. Trichotomous analysis. Additionally, an intuitive rating with subsequent 
computerized operationalization was performed, quite analogous to the method 
applied in the empathy case. This procedure suggested a division into three 
groups: Recognizers, Nonrecognizers, and a third group composed of children 
who showed a striking tendency to avoid their mirror image, by going away from 
the mirror, gaze aversion, turning away abruptly when catching own gaze, or 
trying to avoid mirror altogether. These children either localized the eye-shadow 
marking or did not do so. They were called Transitionais. Figure 12.4 shows the 
distribution of subjects according to the two analyses performed. 
The decision tree shown in Fig. 12.5 presents the objective categories that 
allowed for Computer reconstruction of the trichotomic grouping. 
• Children intuitively rated as Recognizers turned out to have two or fewer 
incidents of avoidance, and to be mirror-positive. 
• When children had two or fewer incidents of avoidance and were mirror-
negative, they were defined as N o n r e c o g n i z e r s . 
• T r a n s i t i o n a i s could be mirror-positive or mirror-negative. They all had 
three or more incidents of avoidance and differed in this respect significantly 
from the Nonrecognizers (U = 2.97, p < 0.01). However, some of the Recog-
12. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPATHY IN INFANTS 265 
Dichotomie analysis 
mirror-positives mirror-negatives 
14 
'//////, 
Recognizers Transits Non-Rec. 
Trichotomic analysis 
FIG. 12.4. Results in recognition test. Upper part: Mark localization or 
proper naming. Lower part: Grouping according to intuitive criteria. 
Mark localisation on face 
or proper naming 
Intensive 
avoidance 
+ 
Intensive 
avoidance 
+ 
Initially tries to touch 
marking on mirror 
Experimenting 
Playmate 
FIG. 12.5. Decision tree with 
criteria for the self-recognition 
grouping. 
+ 
266 BISCHOF-KÖHLER 
nizers also had more than three incidents of avoidance. Thus additional criteria 
had to be found to distinguish them from the mirror-positive Transitionais. These 
criteria were trying to localize the marking on the mirror surface before localiz-
ing it in the face and/or playmate behavior without experimenting. 
P l a y m a t e b e h a v i o r is a typical reaction of Nonrecognizers. They treat their 
mirror image as if it were another child, by offering objects, playing hide and 
seek, and trying to find somebody behind the mirror. This behavior declines but 
does not totally disappear with the onset of self-recognition. 
Experimenting—as defined by performing mirror-monitored body move-
ments, watching own mimics, grimacing—occurs significantly more often in 
Recognizers than in Transitionais (U = 2.94, p < 0.01). The difference between 
Recognizers and Nonrecognizers, and between Transitionais and Nonrecognizers 
is not significant in this category. 
The influence of age and sex is discussed later. 
R e l i a b i l i t y . The most informative categories were cross-checked by an inde-
pendent rater. These categories showed the following reliabilities (number of 
agreements divided by total number of sample): Prosocial intervention and call-
ing mother's attention: .92; distinction between mirror-positives and mirror-nega-
tives: .94; strong versus weak or no avoidance: .94. 
Additionally the category, prevailing emotion: concerned versus bewildered, 
which was not needed for operationalization although it in fact discriminated 
rather well between Blocked Helpers and Perplexed, was cross-rated (for 
Blocked Helpers and Perplexed only) with a reliability of .81. 
E m p a t h y a n d M i r r o r R e c o g n i t i o n : C o m p a r i s o n . Figure 12.6 summarizes 
the relation between empathy and self-recognition. Vertically arranged are the 
empathy groups, with Helpers and Blocked Helpers summarized as Empathizers, 
Perplexed and Indifferent as nonempathizers. Horizontally arranged are the mir-
ror-recognition groups according to trichotomic Classification. For comparison, 
the dichotomic mirror categories are indicated by different shading of the bars. 
The results are quite straightforward: Empathizers all passed the rouge-test 
positively, or named themselves properly. Children who did not yet recognize 
their own mirror image did not show behavior that qualified for empathy. The 
correlation between empathizers/nonempathizers and mirror-positive/mirror-
negative behavior is r = .80, p < 0.001. 
Children who qualified as Transitionais in mirror recognition (if compared 
with the rest of the children) are overrepresented among the Perplexed in the 
empathy Situation (r = .58, p < 0.001). 
Mirror recognition and empathy (both counted according to the dichotomous 
grouping) correlate positively with age (empathy vs. age: r = .59, p < 0.001); 
mirror recognition vs. age: r = .63, p < 0.001). The correlation between empa-
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thy and mirror recognition prevails, however, when age is partialled out (r = .68, 
p < 0.001). 
Figure 12.7 shows how age and sex relate to the empathy and recognition 
groupings. There is a (nonsignificant) tendency for girls to score higher in empa-
thy than boys. However, boys are also (nonsignificantly) retarded in self-recogni-
tion, thus the result does not support the assumption of a true sex difference in 
empathy. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Summary of Experimental Evidence 
Proceeding from phylogenetic considerations and including experimental evi-
dence of cognitive Performances of chimpanzees, the hypothesis was developed 
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FIG. 12.7. Empathy and self-recognition: Age and sex distribution. 
and tested that in human ontogeny empathy should emerge spontaneously in all 
children as soon as they are capable of self-objectification and synchronic identi-
fication. Both cognitive achievements are also responsible for recognizing 
oneself in a mirror, so self-recognition should coincide with the first occurrence 
of empathy. These expectations were confirmed by our experimental results: 
Only those children who recognized themselves empathized with a person in 
distress. Prosocial interventions and centering of attention on the person in need 
were taken as criteria to operationalize empathy. Absence of an empathic re-
sponse in Recognizers or mirror-positive Transitionais, which occurred in only a 
small percentage of our sample, does not diminish the result because em-
pathically induced prosocial motivation may be curtailed by independent factors. 
The crucial correlation is unequivocal: None of the children who did not yet 
recognize themselves showed empathy. Thus, evidence is rather strong that self-
objectification and synchronic identification are basic requirements for empathy. 
Empathy and self-recognition correlate with age as well, consequently the 
argument may be put forward that both variables are actually independent of each 
other and only correlate through age. This, however, is improbable because the 
correlation stays consistent when age is partialled out. 
Flirther evidence supporting the narrow relationship of empathy and self-
recognition comes from the correlation of the Transitionais with the Perplexed, 
which is also age-independent except for the children of these groups generally 
belonging to the younger part of our sample. The most striking feature of the 
Transitionais is avoidance of their mirror-image. Mirror-avoidance is confor-
mingly reported by almost all investigators to occur at an age in which self-
recognition is just about to be expected (Amsterdam, 1972; Priel & DeSchonen, 
1986; Schulman & Kaplowitz, 1977; Zazzo, 1979). There are two possible 
explanations for avoidance: (a) The Transitionais who proved mirror-negative 
already sense their mirror image to be related in a special way to themselves. But 
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they are not yet fully capable of identification and therefore become frightened 
by a phenomenon they cannot comprehend. Hence, the avoidant behavior would 
characterize an immediate pre-stage of recognition. (b) The Transitionais who 
demonstrate mirror-positive behavior are already able to identify themselves but 
are reluctant to accept their mirror image as belonging to " M e " because it is still 
alarming to realize that one has an external side. This would also explain why 
avoidant behavior still occurs in some Recognizers (for a detailed discussion of 
the phenomenon, see Bischof-Köhler, 1989). 
A majority of the Transitionais, particularly those who were mirror-negative, 
belonged to the group of the Perplexed in the empathy experiment. Here again, 
they demonstrated a half-hearted response. On the one hand their attention kept 
being caught by the playmate; on the other hand, they were not really "with" 
her, and stayed passive. Here, too, they gave the impression of being in a pre-
stage, in which identification with the other person had not yet fully started. 
Theoretical Conclusions 
In our theoretical work we addressed two different questions: First, how an 
emotion similar to that of the observed person is evoked in the observer, and 
second, how the observer manages to escape the spell of this emotion and keep it 
confined to the other person. The second question led us to the concept of self-
objectification. As for the first question, the distinction made between ex-
pression-induced and situation-induced empathy is relevant. Expression-induced 
empathy in principle may be based on emotional contagion. Situation-induced 
empathy, however, requires perspective-induction through identification. 
Our experiment does not allow us to determine which forms of empathy 
prevailed in the individual case. However, the odds are in favor of situation-
induced empathy. Consider that not a Single subject of our sample exhibited 
emotional contagion, although this response would have been expected to occur 
at least in those children who were not yet able to self-objectify. As a matter of 
fact, however, neither the perplexed nor the indifferent children were affected by 
contagious grief, judging by the fact that none of them secured comfort for 
themselves from the mother. It can be concluded, then, that our experimental 
setting offered only weak cues to elicit a contagious response, maybe because the 
playmates, anxious to perform credibly, expressed their grief only in a moderate 
form, whereas the situational cues were rather pronounced. 
The empathic responses observed in our experiments, then, were presumably 
elicited mainly by the Situation, not by the expression, of the playmate. If this 
were true it would strongly support the assumption that emotional contagion is 
not a necessary precondition of empathy, but may be substituted by perspective 
induction through identification. 
Although we proceeded from a somewhat different theoretical perspective, 
our results experimentally confirm Hoflfman's (1976) hypothesis that empathy (in 
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our sense, i.e., distinct from mere emotional contagion) develops as early as the 
second year of life. They also parallel the observational findings of Zahn-Waxler 
and colleagues (1979) with the additional effect that in our experimental setting, 
empathic responses to simulated emotions occurred even though the other person 
was comparatively unfamiliar. 
The view held by cognitivists that empathy requires higher mental abilities 
and therefore cannot emerge prior to the fifth year proves untenable in the light of 
this combined evidence. Children do, at a much earlier age, have access to the 
inner experience of other people, and they are socially competent to intervene in 
another's favor. A quite different question is whether they are able to reflect on 
what they are doing. This, indeed, is not the case, and therefore experimental 
settings in which young children are confronted with vignettes showing persons 
in a plight, and then asked to verbalize their impressions, cannot be expected to 
uncover their real social competence. Instead, when studying empathy, it is 
imperative to involve them in a Situation having the character of a real-life event 
and allowing them to transform their empathical response into social action. 
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